Description
A central bank needs authority and a sphere of independent action. But a central bank cannot become an unelected czar with sweeping, unaccountable discretionary power. How can we balance the central bank's authority and independence with needed accountability and constraints? Drawn from a 2015 Hoover Institution conference, this book features distinguished scholars and policy makers' discussing this and other key questions about the Fed.
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Six papers from a May 2013 conference at Stanford's Hoover Institution express views of scholars and policymakers on the proper role of central banks in the economy and society. They cover how central banks can deliver credible commitment and be "emergency institutions;" policy rule legislation practice; goals versus rules as central bank performance measures; institutional design: deliberations, decision, and committee dynamics; some historical reflections on the governance of the Federal Reserve; and a panel on independence, accountability, and transparency in central bank governance. Annotation ©2016 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)
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